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Abstract
In this paper we set up an evolutionary game-theoretic model aimed
at addressing the issue of local public good provision via direct commit-
ment of voluntary forces (namely, private donors and nonproﬁt providers)
only. Two classes of agents are assumed to strategically interact within
a ‘double critical mass’ model, where the provision and maintenance, on
voluntary bases, of a public-type good is concerned. Uncertainty as to
equilibrium outcomes emerges as within both categories a positive pro-
portion of agents faces the temptation to opportunistically free ride on
others’ eﬀorts. Further, private donors and nonproﬁt providers’ payoﬀ
functions are interdependent, in the sense that (a) potential donors de-
cide to be actual donors only insofar as a ‘large enough’ proportion of
nonproﬁt organizations provides a high eﬀort level, otherwise they act as
free riders; (b) nonproﬁt organizations, in turn, prefer to exert a high
productive eﬀort only insofar as a ‘large enough’ proportion of poten-
tial donors acts as actual donors, otherwise they exert a low eﬀort level.
Through this analytical framework, we are able to focus on the critical
factors aﬀecting the dynamic outcome of such interaction: under certain
conditions, in a medium-long run perspective, even in contexts where, ini-
tially, either a large proportion of agents behaves as free riders or a large
proportion of nonproﬁt organizations exerts a low eﬀort level, the local
public good may be provided.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
As far as private provision of collective goods is concerned, most part of the the-
oretical models dealing with such issue tend to explain it by exclusively focusing
on the features of the demand side, namely individual donors.1 The basic goal
of our model is to take a step further, at both methodological and substantive
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1It is worth specifying that it may sound puzzling to consider individual contributors to
nonproﬁt organizations as part of the ‘demand side’. The point is that, though they may not be
1level, in order to broaden the demand-focused framework prevailing in the litera-
ture by including also the supply side into the picture. More speciﬁcally, we will
assume that demand and supply strategically interact within an evolutionary
context, so that the possibility to eﬀectively produce a given collective good will
turn out to be critically dependent on the nature of such interaction. Ben-Ner
(2002) points out the main diﬃculties nonproﬁt organizations may encounter in
pursuing their social mission, by reﬂecting on the following ﬁve requirements to
be met for their establishment and operation:
“The ﬁrst requirement for the establishment of an organization
is the availability of entrepreneurial initiative. A nonproﬁt organi-
zation cannot attract entrepreneurs who seek proﬁts. The initiative
must therefore come from charitable entrepreneurs, or individuals
with demand for the nonproﬁt form of organization. The second
requirement for the emergence of an organization is the availability
of funding, which again must come from either those with demand
for the organization, or those who care about them. Third, produc-
tion of products with signiﬁcant nonrivalry and nonexcludability at-
tributes must be funded not only through the ordinary sale of goods
and services on the market, but also through additional voluntary
contributions. Fourth, the organization must be able to commit
credibly to its customers to maintain its form as an alternative to
the for-proﬁt type of organization, in order to retain their support.
Finally, the survival of an organization is predicated on its ability
to produce eﬃciently: at the very least, the organization’s eﬃciency
disadvantage must not exceed whatever other advantages it enjoys
relative to other ﬁrms”.
Ben-Ner’s contribution then suggests that a nonproﬁt organization must, at
the same time, (a) rely on special voluntary contributions and (b) act credi-
bly and eﬃciently. In this work, we would like to explore, within a strategic,
evolutionary scenario, the bi-directional link between (a) and (b), by emphasiz-
ing its critical role in the provision of a given collective-type good: being able
to create a virtuous relationship between donors’ propensity to contribute and
nonproﬁt’s level of eﬃciency in pursuing its socially-charged goals appears to
be crucial in order to make individual donations a central and stable source of
funding for the organization. In other words, two important variables such as
the level of individual donations and the level of nonproﬁts’ eﬃciency, seem to
be mutually dependent: (1) individuals appear to often act in a consequential-
istically-oriented way, i.e. to condition their donations to the level of eﬃciency
actual consumers of the good or service provided by the supported organizations, they clearly
provide an important source of income for such organizations, so that, conventionally, they
have been placed within this side of economic interaction. Analogously, nonproﬁt institutions
are part of the ‘supply side’ as they provide collective goods, though they may partially rely
on economic contributions by donors and, to some extent, ‘demand’ this form of support (e.g.
by means of fundraising eﬀorts).
2the beneﬁciary organization can actually reach; in turn, (2) nonproﬁti n s t i t u -
tions’ independence and ability to pursue their social mission critically depends
on making individuals’ donations a major and stable source of income, i.e. on
being able to continuously raise a relatively large amount of income from private
donations over time. More speciﬁcally, as far as (1) is concerned, by simultane-
ously focusing on demand and supply characteristics, we are able to account for
the following fact: it seems to be frequently the case that individuals’ propensity
to donate critically depends on the expectation that the overall contributions
raised by the nonproﬁt institution will be eﬀective, i.e. that an eﬃcient tech-
nology is at work in the provision process of the public good. In other words,
individuals’ disposition to give may be characterized by a strong consequential-
ist attitude, regardless of its being pure or impure, i.e. driven mainly by truly
selﬁsh, genuinely altruistic or mixed motives.
In this light, in our model, the only ‘constraint’ donors require to be re-
spected by nonproﬁt providers is the eﬃcient pursuit of their social mission:
this sounds like a rather minimal, reasonable constraint, as it does not aﬀect
the content of nonproﬁts’ mission and, therefore, it is not controversial in eth-
ical terms.2 Further, there is some evidence that this constraint may actually
increase the level of funding for such organizations: “Constraints on how con-
tributions are used may actually augment the supply of funds. This could
occur if informational asymmetries (i.e. donors not knowing how funds would
be used) would cause donors to give less unless the use of funds was appropri-
ately restricted. A university alumnus, for example, might wish to earmark a
gift for ﬁnancial aid, to be certain that the money would not go for a football-
stadium scoreboard. At the same time, the fungibility of money can have a net
eﬀect quite diﬀerent from that reﬂected in the donor’s restriction” (Weisbrod
1998). In other words, donors may well accept not to participate in the non-
proﬁt ﬁrm’s control and management, but, in return to their ﬁnancial support,
they require that the money will not be wasted but used according to appro-
priate criteria. While nonproﬁts are in principle trustworthy, right because
of their very nature (speciﬁcally, thanks to the well-known ‘Non Proﬁt Distri-
bution Constraint’), public provision would probably ﬁnd it diﬃcult to gain
private donors’ trust (see, e.g., Santagata and Signorello 2000). In this regard,
a relevant distinction has been introduced between exogenous and endogenous
donative revenues, where the latter, unlike the former, are, to some extent, af-
fected by the nonproﬁt’s activities. In our model, donations are assumed to
be endogenous, but, as we made clear, the constraint imposed on nonproﬁt’s
activity is really a minimal one and simply reﬂects the consequentialist nature
of donors’ propensity to support the organization. Weisbrod (1998) correctly
2In general, serious ethical problems may arise as “too much donor control is hazardous
t oan o n p r o ﬁt organization’s integrity. When the terms of a proposed gift would redirect an
institution’s core mission, that gift usurps control that rightfully belongs to the nonproﬁt, for
which image and branding are sine qua non. For example, a gift endowment of a university
chair that is contingent on naming speciﬁc faculty members or on teaching a particular point
of view would be an inappropriate donor infringement on academic freedom” (Emerging issue:
how much donor involvement is too much?, Advancing Philanthropy, Nov/Dec 2000).
3remarks that “Not surprisingly, donations have been found to be responsive to
fund-raising eﬀorts (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986), but they may also respond
to other organization activities. Surely, charitable contributions respond to a
nonproﬁt’s mission-related outputs, to its reputation for eﬃciency and integrity,
and hence to its trustworthiness to use donated funds eﬀectively, although there
has been little research on these relationships”. A relatively speciﬁc but rele-
vant point that still awaits deeper investigation is whether donors’ propensity to
contribute depends more on nonproﬁts’ eﬃciency in pursuing their institutional
goals or on their level of fundraising eﬀorts (which represents an ancillary ac-
tivity with respect to their social mission); further, we cannot rule out that the
latter variable might be perceived by the donors as a good proxy of the former,
acting as a signal of nonproﬁt’s will to act according to eﬃciency standards.3
According to Ben-Ner (2002), in the U.S. nonproﬁt organizations may beneﬁt
from the recent tendency of some large for-proﬁt ﬁnancial institutions to rapidly
turn into important fund-raising channels.4
Nonproﬁts may rely, in principle, on multiple, distinct sources of funding:
beside individual donations, further signiﬁcant channels are income from the sale
of goods and/or services, user fees and (direct and indirect) public subsidies. In
the U.S., where nonproﬁt revenues make up about 10% of the GNP, it is increas-
ingly harder to precisely deﬁne the boundaries between for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt
sectors (Arrow 1998) and the essence of such phenomenon is well captured by
Weisbrod (1998), as he notices that nowadays “Many nonproﬁts face increasing
ﬁnancial pressure because the gap between their resources and what they see as
social “need” is growing. (...) “Need” is diﬃcult to deﬁne and measure, but
if nonproﬁts search for new revenues, they have few choices: to increase private
donations and/or to increase income from the sale of goods or services — that
is, “commercial” activity”. The problem is that if nonproﬁts choose to mainly
rely on user fees, i.e. on revenues from the sale of goods or services on the
market, they run the risk to lose their speciﬁc identity and not to diﬀerentiate
themselves anymore from for-proﬁt ﬁrms, by ending up mimicking their sta-
t u so fp r i v a t eg o o d ss e l l e r sa n dproﬁt-oriented organizations. Commenting on
this phenomenon, which seems to be characteristic of the current phase of rapid
growth of the nonproﬁt sector in the U.S., Weisbrod (1998) points out that such
trend risks to induce people to perceive nonproﬁt organizations as ‘for-proﬁts
in disguise’. Therefore, as to the issue of how to balance nonproﬁts’ pursuit
3Segal and Weisbrod (1998) show, through an empirical study on tax-return data regarding
large charitable U.S. organizations and covering the period 1985-1993, that fundraising plays
a very important role in actually enhancing the level of individual donations. In particular,
they reach the conclusion that current and lagged values of fundraising expenditures, together
with ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects and lagged contributions, succeed in explaining about one third of
the year-to-year variation in donations.
4He provides the interesting example of Fidelity Investment, a very large for-proﬁt ﬁnancial
institution, that “has become the second largest recipient (actually, a channel like a community
foundation) of charitable giving in the United States in 2000, after the Salvation Army (The
Chronicle of Philanthropy, November 1, 2001). Fidelity’s Charitable Gift Fund website (...)
also oﬀers information that allows potential donors to understand better the organizational
and ﬁnancial aﬀairs of the nonproﬁt organizations to which they consider making donations”.
4of their institutional mission with growing ﬁnancial constraints, he argues that
such organizations would be really free to autonomously pursue their social mis-
sions only insofar as they were able to rely on income from individual donations
without being conditioned to any speciﬁc behaviour in return. By contrast, if
they mainly depended on either user fees or subsidies by (local and/or national)
Government, they would risk to be forced to re-deﬁne their goals and, in the
medium-long term, to lose their original identity. Such compromising of mission
in the interest of revenue has been described as mission displacement (Weisbrod
1998).5 This is why the growing tendency, in the U.S., for nonproﬁts to receive
less and less support in the form of private donations (with a fall in their relative
importance as a source of funding from 53% to 24% in less than thirty years)
and to conversely obtain more and more of their income from the sale of goods
and services on the market sounds as a somewhat worrying perspective to many
observers.6 Further, Ben-Ner (2002) points out that a great deal of recent, im-
portant technological changes are going to bring about negative consequences
as to the future of nonproﬁt organizations. Some of them, for example, seem
to contribute to reduce the degree of nonrivalry and nonexcludability of certain
products, so further broadening the space for for-proﬁt ﬁrms. As to the issue of
nonproﬁts’ funding, it should be clear, however, that the crucial distinction to
be drawn is not simply between one source of revenue and another, but rather
between restricted and unrestricted support (Weisbrod 1998). With respect to
consequentialistically-oriented donors, their donations can certainly be seen as
basically unrestricted donations: as we clariﬁed above, the ‘eﬃciency constraint’
is a rather minimal requirement and does not aﬀect at all nonproﬁt’s freedom
of choice as to where and how to operate in pursuing its social mission. The
remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains the evolutionary model;
Section 3 introduces the notion of evolutionary crowding-out; Section 4 draws
the main conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider two continuous populations (potential donors and nonproﬁt orga-
nizations), both split in turn into two groups (actual donors and free riders, and
high and low eﬀort level nonproﬁts, respectively). This means that we are deal-
ing with a ‘very large’ number of nonproﬁt organizations (the supply side) and,
at the same time, with a ‘very large’ number of individuals potentially inter-
5With regard to this ‘tragic’ scenario, Weisbrod (1998) asserts that “When it occurs, it
is likely to take subtle forms that are hard to observe. Rarely will an organization reject its
mission outright, for even if the nonproﬁt’s leadership were willing to do so, such a rejection
would have vast consequences for them in terms of their ﬁduciary responsibility, as well as for
the organization’s tax-exempt status and its donative revenues. Nonetheless, the potential for
mission to be compromised, albeit in less direct forms, exists, particularly so in light of the
breadth of many nonproﬁts’ missions, which can make it diﬃcult to deﬁne operationally when
an action is inconsistent with the mission”.
6Hansmann (1980) introduced the useful distinction between ‘donative’ and ‘commercial’
nonproﬁts, depending on the relative importance of donations and user fees as a source of
r e v e n u ef o rt h eo r g a n i z a t i o n .
5ested in economically supporting such organizations (the demand side). Time
is continuous. Such interaction has to do with the familiar issue regarding the
private provision of public-type goods, as nonproﬁt organizations are assumed
to be directly committed to the provision of a single, threshold public good.I n
the strategic framework under exam, by referring to a ‘threshold public good’ we
mean a collective good which will be provided only if a certain amount is both
(a) collected (i.e. ‘many’ donors actually contribute) and (b) eﬃciently used
by nonproﬁt operators (i.e. ‘many’ nonproﬁts productively utilize the available
amount of funding).7 Further, we assume that the public good will increase in
both quality and quantity the larger the proportion of actual donors (on the
demand side) and eﬃcient nonproﬁts (on the supply side). In the light of this,
as both actual donors and eﬃcient nonproﬁts need to be in large proportions
in order for the public good to be provided, we may even more precisely re-
fer to the strategic environment under study as to a ‘double threshold public
good’ scenario. Besides, we assume that donors’ contributions are of the binary,
‘all-or-nothing’ type: either a single potential donor contributes to ﬁnancing
the public good by a certain, pre-determined positive amount (by acting as an
actual donor) or she gives nothing (by acting as a free rider). As it can be easily
veriﬁed, the strategic scenario considered in this paper is a generalization of the
relatively speciﬁc analysis developed in Antoci and Sacco (1996) and in Antoci,
Sacco and Zarri (2003). In those works, the double threshold public good to
be provided is given by an art city (such as Paris, Florence or Barcelona), as
its preservation over time may entail the simultaneous commitment of a large
number of local cultural operators and a large number of individual donors gen-
erously contributing to economically support the project. Clearly, the public
nature of the good under consideration (restoring historical monuments and/or
enhancing the quality of cultural activities within the city) may induce some
potential donors to free ride on others’ eﬀorts and abstain from contributing, so
jeopardizing the provision of the good itself — despite the possible presence of a
large proportion of eﬃcient cultural operators. In a totally symmetric way, some
local operators may be unable and/or unwilling to eﬃciently use the amount of
resources provided by private donors: even in this case, the private provision of
the public good may be seriously at risk, despite the potentially large amount
of available funds. In the following section, we make use of the same assump-
tions and basic framework introduced in the above cited papers. However, we
provide here a far more general interpretation and we proceed by considering
some speciﬁc scenarios we had not dealt with in the previous works. Further,
a notion such as ‘evolutionary crowding-out’ is introduced and analyzed within
the current framework.
2.1 Behavioral Assumptions and Social Dynamics
The classical models based on the so called ‘pure altruism hypothesis’ (or on, as
Sugden (1982) — perhaps more appropriately — prefers to term it, the ‘publicness
7The subsequent formalization will make clear that such statements can be provided with
a rigorous characterization within the evolutionary framework set up here.
6assumption’) represent a satisfactory default option in the aim to provide con-
vincing answers to the voluntary public goods provision issue, as by deﬁnition
no donations would occur in a world of individuals pursuing their material self-
interest in the strict sense of the word. In such a framework, free riding would
be an extensive phenomenon and no public good would be privately provided
— insofar as nonproﬁt organizations exclusively relied on any source of income
but private donations. However, we need to take a step even further and set
up a more complex picture in order to account for the important and growing
insights coming from experimental and empirical contributions on the theme.
Speciﬁcally, as far as the demand side is concerned, it is necessary to depart from
the ‘representative agent’ assumption implicit in most of the models character-
izing the existing theoretical literature in the ﬁeld: our market economies are
embedded in increasingly motivationally heterogeneous societies which do pos-
sess such complex features as a result of several cultural, social and economic
factors that historically aﬀected the motivational proﬁle of economic agents as
well. In this light, we assume here that potential donors fall into two somehow
opposite categories: actual donors and free riders. More speciﬁcally, we rely on
the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Private donors can either be actual donors (D) or act as
free riders, i.e behave opportunistically (O) towards actual donors.
In a sense, such a distinction is implicit in several models relying on the
pure altruism hypothesis, as even there the free riding phenomenon is a far
from excluded behavioral alternative (implying that some agents are driven by
‘enlightened self-interest’ and that, therefore, social interaction takes the form
of a Chicken Game in the altruists’ eyes, caring about the provision of the col-
lective good but, at the same time, preferring that others will carry the burden
of contribution costs). Here we make it explicit, by assuming that the overall
population of potential donors is initially split into two very diﬀerent groups
such as (consequentialistically-oriented) actual donors and free riders.8 Sym-
metrically, we draw a similar distinction with regard to the supply side, within
the (inﬁnite) set of nonproﬁt institutions. As anticipated above, we discriminate
between nonproﬁts exerting a ‘high’ productive eﬀort and nonproﬁts producing
only a ‘low’ eﬀort. In other words, a proportion of ﬁr m si sa s s u m e dt ob ee ﬃ-
cient, whereas all the others are ‘lazy’ and have no incentives to use the collected
resources in an eﬃcient way. Therefore, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.N o n p r o ﬁt organizations can exert either a high-level eﬀort
(H) or a low-level eﬀort (L) in privately providing the collective good.
As far as the demand side is concerned, potential donors’ payoﬀ functions
are described by the following two linear functions (1) and (2), referred to actual
8The risk that free riding occurs is a rather plausible possibility in a strategic interac-
tion scenario where the provision of a public good is involved, as Ben-Ner (2002) asserts by
commenting on the requirements nonproﬁt organizations need to meet in order to keep on
surviving within a complex economic system: “These requirements determine the likelihood
of the existence — that is, the supply, of a nonproﬁt organization. Each of these depends on
successful collective action, and is vulnerable to free-ridership or social loaﬁn ge x a c t l yb yt h e
very individuals who desire the existence of the nonproﬁt organization”.
7donors (D) and free riders (O), respectively. Analogously, on the supply side,
nonproﬁts’ payoﬀ functions are captured by functions (3) and (4), representing
high level eﬀort (H) and low level eﬀort (L) nonproﬁt organizations, respectively:




where α − β>θ>0 and γ − ε>η>0.9
The variables q and p indicate the proportion of H-type nonproﬁts and
D-type donors respectively (consequently, it holds 0 ≤ q,p ≤ 1);
1 − q and 1 − p represent the proportion of L-type nonproﬁts and O-type
donors respectively. We assume further that both potential donors and non-
proﬁt organizations are able to observe in any moment the actual level of both
q and p (and, as a consequence, of 1 − q and 1 −p as well). In the light of this,
it is then straightforward to realize that payoﬀ functions (1)-(4) incorporate the
relation of strategic interdependence connecting individual donors and nonproﬁt
organizations illustrated above. Speciﬁcally, equations (1) and (2), by making
donors’ payoﬀs positively depend on the proportion of high eﬀort level (H-type)
nonproﬁts, convey the hypothesis that donors’ propensity to contribute is posi-
tively related to the expectation that an eﬃcient technology is at work for the
public good to be voluntarily provided. Analogously, equations (3) and (4),
by making nonproﬁts’ payoﬀs proportional to the proportion of actual donors
(D-type, i.e. non-free riding agents), imply that nonproﬁt providers’ propensity
to be productive is positively related to the expectation that a suﬃciently high
level of contributions is available for the pursuit of their institutional goals.
Following Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), we
suppose that the dynamincs of p and q is given by the replicator equations:
9Through these restrictions over parameter values, we make sure that no option dominates
the alternative one regardless of the other class of agents’ behaviours. Speciﬁcally, if we refer,
say, to individual donors, we notice that by assuming α − β>θ>0,i ti st h ec a s et h a tw h e n
q =0 ,t h e nΠ(O) > Π(D), but when q =1 ,t h e nΠ(D) > Π(O). This clearly implies that a
’critical threshold’ q∗ exists (with 0 <q ∗ < 1) such that when q<q ∗, then free riders prevail
over actual donors, but when q>q ∗, then actual donors get a higher reward (and spread over
in the population) than free riders. The same holds true as far as the two types of nonproﬁt
organizations are concerned. As we pointed out above, so far the formal structure of the
model perfectly coincides with the one already illustrated in Antoci, Sacco and Zarri (2003)
















q are the time derivatives of the variables p and q, respectively,
and ¯ Πp and ¯ Πq represent average payoﬀs:
¯ Πp = p · Π(D)+( 1− p)Π(O)
¯ Πq = q · Π(H)+( 1− q)Π(L)
In other words, we are assuming here that the relative frequencies of types are
driven by their relative performances within the strategic scenario under study:
in such a social learning process, the most rewarding strategies are imitated at
the expense of non successful ones. By Cressman (1997) we know that the (local)
stability results regarding the replicator dynamics carry over to any payoﬀ-
monotonic dynamics (see also Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996) and Samuelson
(1997) for some rigorous microfoundations). In this model, this implies that,
say, free riders (low-eﬀort nonproﬁts) may turn into actual donors (high-eﬀort
nonproﬁts) — or viceversa — insofar as their ‘alternative’ type happens to better
perform in social interaction in terms of payoﬀs: in other words, both classes
of agents (potential donors and nonproﬁt organizations) are assumed to act on
the basis of endogenous preferences10, so that shifting between types may take
place within each of the two classes of agents. Speciﬁcally, social dynamics is
driven here by the following equations:
˙ p = p(1 − p)[(α − β)q − θ] (5)
˙ q = q (1 − p)[(γ − ε)p − η] (6)




,w h e r e 0 <
η
γ − ε




,w h e r e0 <
θ
α − β
< 1 always holds
10“The possibility that endogenous preferences may be driven by an evolutionary dynamics
has been already suggested by Becker (1976a). The evolutionary approach does not necessarily
advocate a biologically based preference dynamics although recent studies have shown the
existence of genes that determine preference attributes like risk aversion. While the setup is
based on evolutionary dynamics, the mechanism that governs these dynamics may be rooted in
behavior such as imitation and education. For evolutionary models that endogenize preferences
see Basu (1995), Bester and Güth (1998), Dekel and Scotchmer (1999), Fershtman and Weiss
(1997, 1998), Huck and Oechssler (1999), Kockesen et al. (2000), Robson (1996), and Rogers
(1994)” (Bar-Gill and Fershtman 2001).
9The analysis of dynamics of system (5)-(6) is straightforward and the phase
diagram is represented in ﬁgure 1.11 As we can see from the phase diagram in
ﬁgure 1, the ‘default’ scenario contains two attractive ﬁxed points (namely, (0,0)
and (1,1)), two respulsive ﬁxed points (namely, (1,0) and (0,1))a n do n esaddle
point (p∗,q∗). The basins of attraction of the two attractive ﬁxed points are
separated by the stable manifold Γ of (p∗,q∗): the trajectories starting above Γ
reach (1,1), the others reach (0,0). The intuitive meaning of such a diagram can
be explained as follows. When both p and q are high enough, then the system
converges to the attractive ﬁxed point (1,1), which represents the best social
outcome, that is the social conﬁguration where all potential donors are actual
donors (p =1 ) and all nonproﬁt organizations are high-eﬀort level nonproﬁts
(q =1 ). Provided our basic assumptions, this entails that the public good will
be voluntarily provided at the highest possible level, as all nonproﬁts behave
eﬃciently and have access to a large amount of voluntarily provided funds. By
contrast, the other attractive ﬁxed point (0,0) depicts the worst social outcome,
as in this case all potential donors prefer to act as free riders and all nonproﬁts
exert a low eﬀort level. As a consequence, no public good provision occurs. In
this light, it is straightforward to characterize the stable manifold Γ of (p∗,q∗)
as the ‘critical threshold’ which turns out to be decisive in order to discriminate
between dynamic paths leading to social optimality and dynamic paths leading
to social ineﬃciency. Observe that Γ can be considered as the graph of a strictly
decreasing function q = f(p); consequently, to reach the socially desirable out-
come, the lower is the initial proportion p of potential donors which are ready to
actually donate, the higher must be the initial proportion q of nonproﬁts which
eﬃciently manage the funds raised through private donations (and vice-versa).
3 The relationship between Government and Vol-
untary Sector: Evolutionary Crowding-out
In order to rigorously recall the major conclusions obtained so far in the the-
oretical literature dealing with the issue of the Crowding-in/Crowding-out re-
lationship between Government grants and private contributions to nonproﬁts,
it may be helpful to start from the following deﬁnition of the so called classic
Crowding-out hypothesis:
Deﬁnition 1 Givers (who may or, more likely, may not coincide with the tax-
payers) perceive their tax-ﬁnanced, involuntary donations as a (perfect or im-
perfect) substitute for their voluntary donations to nonproﬁt organizations.
Individuals’ contributions to the Voluntary Sector (charities) has often been
seen as a reliable indicator of the extent of voluntary provision of public goods.
11In all ﬁgures, an attractive ﬁxed points is indicated by a full dot (•), a repulsive one by
an open dot (◦) and a saddle point by tracing its stable and unstable manifolds, that is by















11The extreme prediction of complete Crowding-out tends to be rejected by em-
pirical studies: a negative correlation tends to emerge, but it appears to be
partial, rather than one-to-one. Speciﬁcally, data from Abrams and Schmitz
(1984) and Steinberg (1985) seem to conﬁrm that a partial Crowding-out eﬀect
often occurs. In fact, the overall picture is more complex and blurred, as some
authors report Crowding-in eﬀects (see on this e.g. Sugden (1982), Khanna,
Posnett and Sandler (1995) and Connolly (1997)). Both Rose-Ackerman (1981)
and Payne (1998) provide a rationale for these eﬀects on the grounds that Gov-
ernment’s donations act as a signal of the quality of the charitable good to be
provided. However, as we speciﬁed above, the main lesson emerging from most
of the studies on Crowding-in / Crowding-out seems to be that the relation-
ship between Government grants and individual donations to nonproﬁts is not
a positive but a negative one but that, at the same time, Crowding-out is not
complete but partial. However, regardless of empirical analyses, it is crucial to
properly address this issue at theoretical level: in order to do this, we claim that
traditional demand-side explanations (based on speciﬁc assumptions on individ-
ual motivational systems and on the eﬀects of donors’ behavioural response to
Government grants), need to be integrated with founded supply-based analyses
f o c u s e do nt h en a t u r eo fn o n p r o ﬁts’ behavioural response to Government grants.
In other words, both Charities’ as well as private donors’ strategic behaviours
matter and ought to be studied together by means of a uniﬁed approach to
economic interaction taking place among three classes of agents, i.e. (i) Govern-
ment (or, more generally, public actors), (ii) private donors and (iii) nonproﬁt
institutions. Further, in the framework of our game-theoretic model, in order to
focus on the critical relationship between private donors and nonproﬁt organi-
zations within the strategic scenario under study, where both classes of agents
exhibit endogenous preferences, an appropriate notion of Crowding-out is called
for. Speciﬁcally, we decided to introduce the idea of Evolutionary Crowding-out,
on the grounds that it provides the natural extension of the classic Crowding-out
notion within the evolutionary social context at stake:
Deﬁnition 2 Evolutionary Crowding-out occurs when, after a change in one
of the parameters aﬀecting either potential donors’ or nonproﬁt organizations’
payoﬀs, the attraction basin of (0,0) expands at the expenses of that of (1,1);i n
other words, all the trajectories which used to converge to (0,0) will still converge
to the socially sub-optimal conﬁguration and at least one trajectory which used
to converge to (1,1) will converge to (0,0).
In a totally analogous way, we then deﬁne Evolutionary Crowding-in as
follows:
Deﬁnition 3 Evolutionary Crowding-in occurs when, after a change in one
of the parameters aﬀecting either potential donors’ or nonproﬁt organizations’
payoﬀs, the attraction basin of (1,1) expands at the expenses of that of (0,0);
in other words, all the trajectories which used to converge to (1,1) will still
converge to the socially optimal conﬁguration and at least one trajectory which











In the light of the above deﬁnitions, we can easily draw a ﬁrst unambiguous
conclusion, as far as strategic interaction among the classes of agents under
exam is concerned:
Proposition 4 If a subsidy is given by the Government to H-type nonproﬁt
providers such that η shifts to ´ η with ´ η<η(or, equivalently, γ − ε increases),
then Evolutionary Crowding-in occurs.
For the proof of the above proposition see the appendix. In ﬁgure 2, the
shaded area within the unit square clearly provides us with the extent of Evo-
lutionary Crowding-in. It may be of interest to remark that a subsidy given
to H-type but not to L-type nonproﬁts constitutes an instance of what Olson
(1965) deﬁnes as a ‘positive selective incentive’, which is able to mobilize latent
groups. Let us now turn to the demand side and make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. A subsidy s = δp is given by the Government to individual
donors deciding to actively play their role (i.e. being actual donors D).
Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2001) set up a similar, evolutionary model with
endogenous preferences and a public good to be accumulated. Their analysis
focuses on the eﬀects of subsidization on the preference dynamics as well as on
the equilibrium level of the public good. Individuals are assumed to interact
13within a random matching structure and play a PD-like game, but nonproﬁti n -
stitutions are not included in the model. Within such a framework, it is the case
that while in the short-run (when preferences are taken as given) the subsidy
policy actually succeeds in increasing the level of the public good, by contrast in
the long-run such a policy induces a shift in the distribution of individual pref-
erences, which, in turn, provokes a reduction in the number of socially minded
agents12 and, eventually, a lower level of the collective good to be provided. As
they explain, “The decline in the share of socially minded individuals, and the
corresponding decrease of social incentives, more than oﬀsets the initial rise in
the monetary incentives induced by the subsidy policy” (Bar-Gill and Fersht-
man 2001). In our model, analogously to the case where H-type nonproﬁts are
the recipients of the subsidy, Government’s economic support to the privately
provided public good takes the form of a ‘positive selective incentive’, as it is
given to D-type but not to O-type donors.13 Further, the above speciﬁcation of
the subsidy policy implies that the level of s is not ﬁxed but positively related to
the proportion of D-type donors, conveying the intuitive idea that the higher the
level of funds raised through individual donations, the higher the incentive for
the Government to keep on indirectly supporting public good provision through
such a policy. In order to rigorously predict what happens under this assump-
tion, it is necessary to see how payoﬀ functions get modiﬁed and to separately
analyze several cases according to parameters relationships:




whe α>β>0, δ>0 and γ − ε>η>0.
Therefore, replicator equations take the following form:
˙ p = p(1 − p)[(α − β)q + δp− θ]
˙ q = q(1 − p)[(γ − ε)p − η]









,w h e r e 0 <
η
γ − ε
< 1 always holds while 0 <q ∗ < 1 if and
12In their model, ‘socially minded agents’ are deﬁned as agents caring about status, i.e.
about a social reward perceived as positively related to their eﬀort towards the provision of
the public good.
13By contrast, in Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2001) model, the subsidy does not act as a


















+ α − β.
Observe that the other ﬁxed points under these equations are (0,0), (1,0),









p =0 ) with the edges of the unit square where q =0and q =1 .T h e
interior ﬁxed point is always a saddle point.
It is easy to check that the following classiﬁcation of cases holds.
CLASSIFICATION OF CASES:
Case 1: α − β ≤ θ − δ
This case is very easy, as the socially suboptimal conﬁguration (0,0) turns
out to be globally attractive, i.e. no other attractive ﬁxed points emerge within
this dynamic scenario.
Case 2: α − β<θ<α− β + δ and θ ≥ δ
Here we need to distinguish between two sub-cases, depending on the value
of q∗ (see ﬁgures 4.a and 4.b). Figures 4.a and 4.b show the dynamics when
q∗ ≥ 1 and 0 <q ∗ < 1 hold respectively (case q∗ ≤ 0 is ruled out under the
parameters conﬁguration concerning case 2).
In both sub-cases, only two attractive ﬁxed points are present, that is (0,0)
and (1,1), and their attraction basins are separated by the stable manifold Γ of
the ﬁxed point on the edge with q =1(in ﬁgure 4.a) or by the stable manifold
























































Case 3: α − β<θ<δ
In this case we have three possible sub-cases; ﬁgures 5.a, 5.b and 5.c show
the dynamic regimes in sub-cases q∗ ≥ 1, 0 <q ∗ < 1 and q∗ ≤ 0, respectively.
In all these sub-cases the ‘usual’ two attractive ﬁxed points emerge (i.e. (0,0)
and (1,1)), whose attraction basins are separated by the stable manifold Γ.
Case 4 (‘Small’ subsidy): δ ≤ θ ≤ α − β
The dynamic regime is showed in ﬁgure 6.
Case 5 (‘Large’ subsidy): θ ≤ α − β and θ<δ
The dynamic regimes are showed in ﬁgures 7.a and 7.b (which concern sub-
cases 0 <q ∗ < 1 and q∗ ≤ 0, respectively). Once again, in both the ‘small’














3.1 Selective Crowding-in and p-dependent Opportunism
In this Section, we focus on a version of the model where two diﬀerent be-
havioural assumptions are made, as far as both classes of potential altruists are
concerned. In particular, we will analyze the diﬀerent cases arising when ac-
tual donors (D) behave according to the Selective Crowding-in prediction (see
Assumption 4 below) and, at the same time, free riders (O) exhibit what we
deﬁne below as ‘p-dependent Opportunism’ (see Assumption 5 below).
Assumption 4. Actual donors (D) behave according to the Selective Crowding-
in hypothesis, i.e. their payoﬀ positively depends on the overall proportion of
actual donors in the population.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) incorporate in their model of social dilemmas a
notion of ‘conditional altruism’, deﬁned in terms of general non-monetary utility
payoﬀs as a function of how many other individuals are contributing. Such an as-
sumption represents an interesting form of consequentialist pro-social attitude,
which turns out to be diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h eo n ec o n s i d e r e dh e r ei nt h eb a s i cf r a m e -
work of the model. However, it is deﬁnitely compatible with the ‘eﬃciency con-
straint’ imposed by individual donors on nonproﬁt organizations in our model,
as it can succeed in augmenting the likelihood of public good provision. In their
model, such an assumption leads to rather intuitive results: by assuming that
agents gain no altruistic beneﬁt from contributing unless the public good is ac-
tually provided, they show that contribution levels turn out to be lower with
respect to the unconditional altruism scenario. As they conclude, in a sense
“conditional altruism is ‘less altruistic’ than unconditional altruism”. Palfrey


























19widespread notion of Selective Crowding-in used in the literature on voluntarily
provided public goods. In particular, substantial economic and psychological
evidence (mostly deriving from laboratory experiments) exists supporting the
Selective Crowding-in Hypothesis (see, e.g., Cialdini (1993), on the relevance of
conformistic behaviour). In this light, it seems plausible to include this type of
assumption also in the evolutionary model presented here, in order to get some
insights about the model’s behavioural predictions. As anticipated above, we
further add the following assumption, regarding free riders’ behaviour:
Assumption 5. Free riders (O) behave according to the p-dependent Op-
portunism hypothesis, i.e. their payoﬀ depends positively on the proportion p of
actual donors (D) in the population when this proportion is small, but depends
negatively on p when p is large.
The rationale behind Assumption 5 is as follows: when the proportion of
actual donors is small, the majority of agents are riding free on others’ eﬀorts, so
that the public good will be likely not to reach the provision-point. By knowing
that this is the more likely scenario, free riders believe that contributing would
be not only ‘individually counterproductive’ (due to material costs), but also
ineﬀective, as far as the aim of collective good provison is concerned; therefore,
in this case they get a further psychological reward from free riding. By contrast,
when the majority of agents is composed by actual donors, the opposite holds
true and free riders ‘feel guilty’ for their selﬁsh choice not to contribute to the
public good provision process.
After including Assumptions 4 and 5 into the picture, payoﬀ functions take
the following form:
Π(D)=αq + ξp− θ (7)
Π(O)=βq + δp− ωp2 (8)
Π(H)=γp− η
Π(L)=εp
where α>β>0, ξ>0 and γ − ε>η>0.
As we can see, Assumptions 4 and 5 have been incorporated in payoﬀ func-
tions (7) and (8), respectively. The replicator equations are now as follows:
˙ p = p(1 − p)
£
(α − β)q +( ξ − δ)p + ωp2 − θ
¤
˙ q = q (1 − p)[(γ − ε)p − η]
Therefore, ˙ q =0when q =0 ,1 ∀p and when p =
η
γ − ε
(< 1) ∀q while ˙ p =0
when p =0 ,1 ∀q and when p and q are such that (α − β)q+(ξ − δ)p+ωp2−δ =
0. Thus, beyond pure population states, ﬁxed points on the edge of the unit
square are the intersection points of the parable with the edges of the square
where q =0and q =1 ; by contrast, on the edges where p =0and p =1there
are never interior ﬁxed points.



































+ α − β
POSSIBLE DYNAMIC REGIMES
For simplicity, we limit ourself to consider the most interesting cases only; the
dynamic regimes concerning omitted cases are (qualitatively) the same as those
encountered up to now. In particular, the possible dynamic regimes are two: the
regime where the ﬁxed point (0,0) is globally attracting and the regime where
both (0,0) and (1,1) are attracting and their attraction basins are separated by
as t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gc u r v eΓ.
Case 1: α − β>θ , ξ − δ<0, α − β+ ξ − δ + ω<θ
The possible dinamic regimes are represented in ﬁgures 8.a and 8.b, concern-
ing the cases 0 <q ∗ < 1 and q∗ ≥ 1, respectively.
In ﬁgure 8.a we obtain two attractive ﬁxed points: (0,0) and (p,1) with
0 < p<1.I nﬁgure 8.b, (0,0) is a globally attractive ﬁxed point within the unit
square. As far as the case in ﬁgure 8.a is concerned, it is of interest to point out
that, for the ﬁrst time, we observe an attractive ﬁxed point where q =1but
0 <p<1. The intuition behind this dynamic feature of the model is as follows:
such ‘mixed conﬁgurations’ emerge because, despite contributions being very
productive (q =1 ), the proportion of actual donors is not suﬃciently large to
induce free riders to ‘feel guilty’ and shift to the alternative behavioural option.
As a result, actual donors and free riders coexist in a social conﬁguration where,
as far as the other class of agents is concerned, all nonproﬁt institutions reach
the highest possible level of eﬃciency.
Case 2: α − β>θ , ξ − δ<0, ξ − δ + ω>θ, δ − ξ<2w and





The possible dinamic regimes are represented in ﬁgures 9.a-9.d; in ﬁgures
9.a and 9.c the dynamic regimes where 0 <q ∗ < 1 are represented while
ﬁgures 9.b and 9.d show the dynamic regimes corresponding to the sub-cases
q∗ ≥ 1 and q∗ ≤ 0, respectively. Note that in the regime illustrated in ﬁgur
9.a there are three attractive ﬁxed points namely, (0,0), (1,1) and (p,1) with
0 < p<1. For the same reasons recalled above, we observe even in this case a
social conﬁguration where all nonproﬁts are very eﬃcient but potential donors
are not motivationally homogeneous (being split between actual donors and free
riders). As far as the other three sub-cases are concerned, we see that the usual





































































































Case 3: α−β>θ , ξ−δ<0, ξ−δ+ω ≤ θ<α−β +ξ−δ+ω, δ− ξ<2w





The dynamic regimes corresponding to this case are very similar to those
of case 2. The only (qualitative) diﬀerence is that, in this case, the ﬁxed point
(1,0) is a source and that the repulsive interior ﬁx e dp o i n ti nt h ee d g ew i t h
q =1doesn’t exist. For example, in ﬁgure 10 the case where three attractive
ﬁxed points exist is illustrated.
4 Comparative Dynamics: Basic Results and Con-
cluding Remarks
In the light of the above analysis, including the most signiﬁcant cases with
respect to the major relationships among parameters, we are able to reach the
following, general conclusions.
Proposition 5 In all the versions of the model, (0,0) is always an attractive
ﬁxed point. In other words, regardless of any other consideration on parameter
relationships, a positive probability exists in all scenarios under study that con-
vergence to the socially suboptimal conﬁguration occurs: this means that in all
scenarios examined here a non-zero set of ‘initial’ pairs (p,q) exists, such that
starting from there strategic interaction leads — in the medium-long run — to the
socially ineﬃcient no-provision outcome.
25When (0,0) is not the unique attractive ﬁxed point, then one or two further
attractive ﬁxed points exist where q =1and p>0.
This is a general conclusion we are capable of drawing on the basis of the
analysis of all the dynamic scenarios considered above: in all the versions of the
model, whenever an attractive ﬁxed point exists where the level of contribution
is positive (with a non-zero set of actual donors, i.e. p>0), productive eﬃciency
reaches the highest possible level (with all nonproﬁts exerting a high-level eﬀort,
i.e. q =1 ). Further, in all dynamic regimes where two or three attractive ﬁxed
points exist, the basin of attraction of (0,0) is separated from those of the other






< 0 for ˙ p 6=0 . This property of the curve Γ e n a b l e su st od r a ws o m e
implications, in terms of comparative dynamics. In particular, following the
same method used in the appendix to prove proposition 4, it is easy to check
that any variation of parameters that rises the values of ˙ p and/or ˙ q , has as
a consequence the expansion of the attraction basins of the ﬁxed points where
q =1and p>0, at the expenses of the attraction basin of (0,0).T h i sm e a n s
that the basin of attraction of ﬁxed points where p>0 increases as α − β, ω,
ξ−δ,γ−ε increase and/or θ and η decrease.Therefore, the following propositions
hold:
Proposition 6 As far as nonproﬁt organizations are concerned, Evolutionary
Crowding-in can occur as a consequence of a Subsidy to H-type providers reduc-
ing the cost of being productive (i.e.↑ γ or ↓ η ).
Proposition 7 As far as individual donors are concerned, Evolutionary Crowding-
in can occur as a consequence of one of the following variations:
(i) An increase in the degree of Selective Crowding-in between D-type donors
(i.e. in the degree of conformism, ↑ ξ).
(ii) A decrease in the overall Cost of contributing to the Public Good on the
part of D-type donors (caused e.g. by a Subsidy or a ‘Warm Glow’ component
a n dm e a s u r e db y↓ θ).
(iii) An increase in the degree of p-dependent Opportunism, on the part of
free riders, i.e. O-type donors (measured by either ↑ ω or ↓ δ).
Such conclusions sound rather intuitive: as far as voluntary provision of pub-
lic good is concerned, variations such as (1) a subsidy to eﬃcient nonproﬁts, (2)
an increase in the degree of Selective Crowding-in among actual donors and (3)
a decrease in the cost of contributing to the good on the part of actual donors
(either because of a subsidy or of ‘warm glow’ motives), all increase — ceteris
paribus — the probability that collective good provision actually occurs. In this
regard, it is important to remark that all these three factors act as ‘positive
selective incentives’, i.e. selectively aﬀect either the pro-social group on the
demand side (actual donors, D) or the eﬃcient institutions on the supply side
(high-eﬀort level nonproﬁt organizations, H). Finally, the analysis has shown
that also an increase in the degree of p-dependent Opportunism will determine
26an Evolutionary Crowding-in eﬀect: this means that when free riders do condi-
tion their behavioural choice to the proportion of actual donors present in the
overall population, the probability for the public good to be provided — other
things equal — increases.
5 Appendix: proof of proposition 4
In this appendix we prove proposition 4. As we have seen, the attraction basins
of the ﬁxed points (0,0) and (1,1) are separated by the stable manifold Γ of the
saddle (p∗,q∗) (see ﬁgure 1) and Γ can be considered as the graph of a function








p < 0.An increase of γ −  (or




q+σ,w h e r eσ>0
(while
·
p does not change) Consequently, after the increase of γ −  ,t h ec u r v e
Γ is no more an invariant curve and it can be crossed by the trajectories of the
‘new’ dynamical system; we aim to prove that it is crossed from the left to the
right; this result would imply that the increase of γ −   generates an expansion
of the attraction basin of (1,1); in other words, with the new parameter values,
there exists a new separatrix Γ
0
of the two attraction basins lying on the left
of the old separatrix Γ (see ﬁgure 2).
To see in what direction the curve Γ is crossed, note that the slope of a
































this proves the proposition.
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